Upstream Contributions

Not every result of this research is a vulnerability. Auditing OpenSSH’s authentication and sandboxing code also produced direct hardening contributions to OpenSSH itself, credited to Manfred Kaiser and listed here for completeness even though they carry no CVE.

Commit

Change

7ab700f170

Made a failure to set SECCOMP or NO_NEW_PRIVS fatal instead of silently continuing with a weaker sandbox. Credited as “Prompted by manfred.kaiser@ssh-mitm.at”. A minor, unrelated finding from the same audit pass was also fixed in passing: commit 4f4aeee6ed, authored directly by Manfred Kaiser, removed a duplicate SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64) entry from the seccomp filter — the syscall was already permitted under its own ifdef guard elsewhere, so this was a cleanup with no security impact.